Inclusive victim beliefs (i.e., perceived similarity with other victim groups worldwide) can have positive effects on intergroup relations. However, there may be limitations to these seemingly constructive construals. We investigated in the Northern Irish context whether inclusive victimhood might sometimes also act as an obstacle to intergroup reconciliation. In Study 1, we found that inclusive victimhood can go along with either high or low competitive victimhood and, in turn, with lesser versus greater willingness for reconciliation, respectively. In Study 2, we asked participants which groups they thought about when responding to inclusive victimhood items, coding whether answers suggested a universal or a selective inclusivity. This type of inclusivity moderated the relationships between inclusive victimhood and readiness for reconciliation: Inclusive victimhood correlated positively with intergroup forgiveness when based on a universal notion of inclusivity, and tended to correlate positively with competitive victimhood when based on a selective notion of inclusivity. These results extend the emerging literature on collective victim beliefs and suggest that expressing shared victimization with other groups may be used strategically to strengthen the ingroup's position in an intergroup conflict, which might act as an obstacle to intergroup reconciliation.
The Two-Sided Role of Inclusive Victimhood for Intergroup Reconciliation: Evidence from Northern Ireland
Over many years, and particularly during the 30 years of "the Troubles", many people in Northern Ireland have become victims of violence perpetrated by both sides, leading to diverse appraisals of how to deal with this legacy (Brewer & Hayes, 2014) . Even among those who were not personally harmed, a subjective sense of collective victimhood can impede reconciliation (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009; Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012 ). Yet, victimization can also unite members of different groups who perceive their experiences as similar, which can promote positive outgroup attitudes and-when it extends to the other conflict party-reconciliation (Shnabel, Halabi, & Noor, 2013; Vollhardt, 2009 Vollhardt, , 2015 . Conversely, inclusive victimhood with victim groups worldwide (third parties, unrelated to the ingroup's conflict) might backlash, contributing to united opposition to the other conflict party and impairing reconciliation. We aimed to examine whether different types of inclusive victim beliefs with different reference groups differentially predict willingness to reconcile. Specifically, we explored the potentially ambivalent role of inclusive victimhood as a facilitator of or obstacle to reconciliation.
Collective victimhood refers to people's sense of group-based victimization by virtue of their identification with a victimized group, even without having been personally harmed (BarTal et al., 2009 ). Victimization involves diminished social power, and at least at the individual level, victimhood is often stigmatized (Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman, 1983) . However, at the collective level the victim status can be used to legitimize outgroup violence. For example, reminding people of historical ingroup victimization reduced their perceived collective guilt for their group's harmful actions in the present (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008) . Bar-Tal et al. (2009) suggest several other consequences of victimhood that may obstruct reconciliation, including delegating responsibility for the conflict, feeling morally superior, and dismissing criticism from other groups.
Elaborating on how collective victim beliefs contribute to conflict maintenance and escalation, Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, and Lewis (2008) and Noor, Brown, and Prentice (2008) showed in Northern Ireland and Chile that people often express "competitive victimhood", believing that the ingroup has suffered more and is the legitimate victim in the conflict. In these studies, competitive victimhood was associated with less trust, desire for forgiveness, and readiness for reconciliation. Similarly, in surveys in Burundi, DRC, and Rwanda, competitive victimhood predicted negative intergroup attitudes and desire to politically exclude outgroups (Vollhardt & Bilali, 2014) .
This view, however, is one-sided in focusing only on negative consequences of collective victimhood. Vollhardt's (2009 Vollhardt's ( , 2015 analysis is more optimistic and suggests how collective victimhood might also contribute to positive intergroup relations. In contrast to "exclusive victim consciousness", which encompasses competitive victimhood and other beliefs regarding the ingroup's unique victimization, "inclusive victim consciousness" entails perceiving similarities between the ingroup's and other groups' victimization. This may or may not include the outgroup in a conflict. Thus, one needs to distinguish between conflict-specific inclusive victim consciousness (perceived similarities with the other conflict party) and general inclusive victim consciousness (perceived similarities with victim groups worldwide; Vollhardt, 2015) . Inclusive victimhood (of both kinds) can promote more positive intergroup outcomes. For example, the aforementioned surveys in Africa also found that conflict-specific inclusive victimhood predicted supporting political inclusion of outgroups and speaking out on their behalf (Vollhardt & Bilali, 2014) . Similarly, reminding Jewish Israelis and Palestinians of shared, conflict-related victimhood increased forgiveness (Shnabel et al., 2013) . Furthermore, Jewish Americans who read about other victim groups during the Holocaust showed an increased prosocial orientation toward present-day victim groups (Vollhardt, 2013) .
However, the potential of inclusive victimhood to facilitate intergroup reconciliation might be limited. First, portraying similarities without acknowledging differences in the groups' suffering might create distinctiveness threat and a need for acknowledgement, which in turn worsens intergroup attitudes (Vollhardt, 2013) . Second, inclusive victimhood rhetoric may also be used strategically to gain legitimacy and elicit solidarity from others-as the examples provided by Yildiz and Verkuyten (2011) of Alevi activists using "inclusive" comparisons (e.g., with other minority groups, the Holocaust) suggest. While such victim beliefs appear inclusive, they are limited to select groups and may entail little outgroup empathy. These dynamics have not yet been studied systematically. The present research attempted to provide a first empirical investigation of potential limitations of inclusive victimhood.
The Present Research
The general aim of the present studies was to investigate the contribution of different victim beliefs to readiness for reconciliation in Northern Ireland, and contribute to the understanding of social psychological processes in this context (for an overview, see Ferguson, Muldoon, & McKeown, 2014) . We hypothesized that while competitive victimhood (comparing two conflict parties' suffering) would be negatively related to readiness for reconciliation, inclusive victimhood (assessing whether similarities with other victim groups in general are perceived) may have positive or negative relationships with readiness for reconciliation.
Readiness for reconciliation can be defined as beliefs supporting social reconstruction, intergroup trust and empathy, and forgiveness. Because there are several different conceptualizations (e.g., Corkalo Biruški & Ajduković, 2009; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008) , we included these to develop factorially valid measures of different dimensions of readiness for reconciliation.
To control for conceptually related correlates of inclusive and competitive victimhood and test their degree of overlap or distinctiveness, we also measured exclusive victimhood (perceived distinctiveness of the ingroup's suffering) and personal centrality of victimhood (Vollhardt, 2010) as well as "perpetual intergroup victimhood orientation" (PIVO) and "fear of victimizing" (FOV; Klar, Schori-Eyal, & Klar, 2013; Schori, Klar, & Roccas, 2009 ). PIVO captures not only the belief in the uniqueness of the ingroup's suffering, but also outgroup distrust and perceived continued threat to the ingroup. PIVO impedes reconciliation. Conversely, FOV assesses apprehension that the ingroup may become an aggressor.
Study 1
In Study 1, the main research question concerned correlations of inclusive and competitive victimhood with other measures of collective victimhood, and their interplay in predicting readiness for reconciliation.
Method
Participants and procedure. A convenience sample of 149 participants (120 female, 29 male) completed the study. Their age ranged from 18 to 55 (M = 25.30, SD = 8.17). Forty-nine identified as Protestants, 4 as Unionist, 1 as Loyalist, 65 as Catholic, 19 as Nationalist, 5 as Republican, and 6 as "Other".
1 62% had a Bachelor's degree or higher and 99% had completed 14 years of school.
Participants were recruited by emails sent to three schools' student mailing lists at a university in Northern Ireland and completed an online questionnaire (n = 136). Other participants were recruited through personal contacts and completed the same questionnaire in paper form (n = 13). After completing the study, participants received a debriefing form including contact details for a Northern Irish victim support group.
Competitive victimhood, PIVO, FOV, inclusive victimhood, exclusive victimhood, personal centrality of victimhood, and intergroup reconciliation orientations were measured as described below, in this order.
Measures.
Sample items for all measures, their means and reliabilities are reported in Table 1 ).
Results
Correlations between all variables are reported in Table 2 weakly negatively with exclusive victimhood, was unrelated to PIVO, FOV, and social reconstruction and forgiveness. This pattern suggests that inclusive victimhood may not always play a constructive role for intergroup reconciliation. Therefore, we explored whether there are subgroups of participants that differ in the meaning they ascribe to inclusive victimhood.
Specifically, we inspected the scatterplot of inclusive and competitive victimhood to identify subgroups with distinct combinations of these two variables ( Figure 1 ). The scatterplot had a triangular shape, in which the variation in competitive victimhood is higher at higher levels of inclusive victimhood than at lower levels. Thus, for some participants inclusive victimhood went together with high levels of competitive victimhood, and for others with low levels of competitive victimhood.
Next, we ran a hierarchical cluster analysis based on participants' inclusive and competitive victimhood scores, with cluster memberships saved and optimized using a k-means cluster-center analysis (see Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, & Kielmann, 2003) . A three-cluster solution resulted in clusters of approximately similar size that were well interpretable (see Figure 1 , and cluster means and standard deviations in Table 3 ; effect sizes of the cluster differences were Eta² = .63 for both inclusive and competitive victimhood). Participants in Cluster 1 (n = 40) expressed average levels of competitive victimhood and relatively low levels of inclusive victimhood.
than those in both Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 in personal centrality of victimhood (p1 < .001; p2 = .005) and PIVO (p1 = .02; p2 = .001). There were no other significant differences.
There were also no cluster differences in age, F(2, 146) = 0.20, p = .82, gender, Chi 2 (2, n = 149) = 0.64, p = .73, or educational level, Chi 2 (4, n = 147) = 4.81, p = .31. 4 However, there was a significant difference in terms of group membership, Chi 2 (3, n = 133) = 25.86, p < .001. In
Cluster 1 (low in inclusive victimhood), Protestants were over-and Nationalists were underrepresented (standardized residuals [s.res.] = 2.39 and -2.20, ps = .017 and .028); and in Cluster 3 (high in both inclusive and competitive victimhood), Nationalists were overrepresented (s.res. = 2.98, p = .003). There were no significant standardized residuals involving Catholics.
Discussion
The analysis revealed that inclusive victimhood was not straightforwardly correlated with reconciliation. Surprisingly, inclusive victimhood was even positively related to competitive victimhood. A closer inspection of this relationship suggests that inclusive victimhood may take on a conflict-enhancing or a constructive meaning. Only when combined with low levels of competitive victimhood did inclusive victimhood predict support for social reconstruction and forgiveness. Conversely, when combined with high levels of competitive victimhood, inclusive victimhood did not predict support for reconstruction or forgiveness.
These ambivalent results led us to hypothesize that there are at least two different types of inclusive victim beliefs, which differ in their scope of inclusivity. One type may represent a universal inclusivity that does not distinguish between different experiences of victimization and focuses on human suffering caused by violent conflict, regardless of its reasons. This form of inclusive victimhood may be associated with empathy for the adversarial group and with a 4 For statistical reasons, in both studies categories with less than five participants were omitted from Chi² analyses.
stronger prosocial orientation, thereby playing a constructive role in intergroup conflict (Shnabel et al., 2013; Vollhardt, 2009; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2014) . The other type may represent a selective inclusivity whereby other victim groups are only included conditionally, depending on their similarity in terms of the conflict position and resulting, specific experiences of victimization (e.g., victims of terrorism; victims of occupation). This type of inclusive victimhood may be primarily motivated by a desire for acknowledgement of the ingroup's suffering, and for furthering its cause and legitimacy in order to obtain support (see Bar-Tal et al., 2009; Vollhardt, 2015) . Selective inclusive victimhood may play a detrimental role for reconciliation and contribute to the conflict by reinforcing the ingroup's conflict position and contributing to hostility, perceived injustice, and desire for revenge.
Study 2
The aim of Study 2 was to examine the two hypothesized types of inclusive victimhood and their implications for reconciliation more directly. We measured inclusive victimhood and competitive victimhood (and exclusive victimhood and personal centrality of victimhood as additional correlates), as well as intergroup empathy and forgiveness as aspects of readiness for reconciliation. Most centrally, we included two open-ended questions asking which victim groups participants had in mind (and why) when responding to the inclusive victimhood items. These questions were designed to assess (without prompting a particular response) the two hypothesized types of inclusive victimhood: universal and selective. We expected that universal inclusive victimhood would be associated with reduced competitive victimhood and increased readiness for reconciliation, whereas selective inclusive victimhood would be associated with increased competitive victimhood and reduced readiness for reconciliation.
Method
Participants and design. A convenience sample of 107 participants (61 female, 46 male) was recruited through personal contacts and snowball sampling, aiming to reach a more general population than in Study 1. Participants completed the questionnaire either online (n = 50) or in paper form (n = 57). Their age ranged from 18 to 74 (M = 35.96, SD = 15.88). Forty-five identified as Protestants, 6 as Unionist, 35 as Catholic, 7 as Nationalist, 3 as Republican, and 11
as "Other". Educational levels were varied; 16% held a postgraduate degree, 34% a Bachelor's degree, 13% HND/NVQ (two years of undergraduate studies), 21% had 14 years of school, 14%
12 years of school, and 3% no degree. The same victim support group information as in Study 1was provided in the debriefing form.
Personal centrality of victimhood, inclusive victimhood, universal versus selective inclusivity, exclusive victimhood, competitive victimhood, forgiveness, and empathy were measured as described below, in this order. For some measures we added items to those used in Study 1 to improve psychometric qualities; for other measures we used shorter, conceptually similar scales.
Materials. Personal centrality of victimhood was assessed with the three items from
Study 1, plus two additional items from Vollhardt (2010) . Inclusive victimhood was measured using two items from Study 1 (slightly modified), plus three additional items from Vollhardt Intergroup forgiveness was assessed using six items from Noor, Brown, and Prentice Inconsistencies between the coders were resolved through discussion. The codes were then checked independently by the other authors, again with inconsistencies discussed (see examples for each category in Table 4 ).
Factorial validity. The 32 items were factor-analyzed (principal axis method, direct oblimin rotation). The scree plot suggested a six-factor solution. All but four items loaded strongly (> .40) and uniquely (secondary loadings < .30) on one factor (see reliabilities and descriptive statistics in Table 5 ).
Results
Correlations are presented in Table 6 To examine our core hypothesis that the relationships between inclusive victimhood and the other variables depend on the type of inclusivity, we used moderated regression analyses.
Type of inclusivity was coded with two contrast variables: the focal contrast (selective -1, missing/unclear 0, universal +1) and an orthogonal contrast (selective +0.5, missing/unclear -1, universal +0.5). Interaction terms were created after z-standardizing inclusive victimhood.
The relationships between inclusive victimhood and competitive victimhood as well as intergroup forgiveness were moderated by the type of inclusivity (see Table 7 ). We also conducted robustness checks, investigating whether these effects remained significant when community membership was considered. When (broad) community membership (focal contrast: Protestant/Unionist -1, Catholic/Nationalist/Republican +1, Other 0; orthogonal contrast: Protestant/Unionist and Catholic/Nationalist/Republican 0.5, Other -1) in addition to type of inclusivity was included as a predictor and moderator of the effects of inclusive victimhood, their interaction effects on competitive victimhood became non-significant, ps > .14.
The interaction effect with type of inclusivity on intergroup forgiveness remained significant, B = 0.21, SE = 0.10, p = .03.
Discussion
Study 2 conceptually replicated Study 1's finding that inclusive victimhood is not always correlated with support for intergroup reconciliation. Although inclusive victimhood was related to lesser exclusive victimhood, it was unrelated to intergroup empathy and forgiveness. Answers to questions about groups participants thought had suffered in similar ways to the ingroup shed more light on these relations. Inclusive victimhood was positively related to forgiveness only when it took on a universal notion, that is, when it referred to similarity to other groups worldwide who suffered because of general causes of conflict, or because of other causes than one's own community. In contrast, inclusive victimhood was positively related to competitive victimhood when it was selective, referring to similarity to other groups worldwide that suffered because of the same specific causes as one's own community.
Although universal inclusivity was somewhat more common among Protestant (and Unionist) participants and selective inclusivity among Catholic (and Nationalist and Republican) participants, this did not affect the links between universal inclusive victimhood and forgiveness.
Only the link between selective inclusive victimhood and competitive victimhood seemed to be partly due to increased selective inclusive victimhood among Catholic, Nationalist, and
Republican participants.
These associations were found even though many participants did not answer the openended questions or provide sufficient detail to code them as selective or universal, which reduced the statistical power to detect interaction effects.
However, using open-ended questions to assess universal and selective inclusive victimhood had the advantage of reducing demand characteristics and not prompting certain responses by asking about specific groups.
General Discussion
Two studies using different methodological approaches suggested that inclusive victimhood is not always associated with constructive intergroup outcomes and reconciliation.
Indeed, it can also relate to competitive victimhood and act as an obstacle to peace. At least two forms of inclusive victimhood need to be distinguished: universal and selective. Constructive effects of inclusive victimhood depend on it being universal. If inclusivity is defined selectively, likely based on a "partisan" notion of conflict, inclusive victimhood may aggravate conflict while also creating solidarity with other selected groups.
Obtaining evidence for the two-sided role of inclusive victimhood was possible because inclusive victimhood was measured more generally, allowing participants to think of groups outside of the ingroup's conflict. This differs from "common victimhood" (Noor et al., 2012; Shnabel et al., 2013) , a form of inclusive victimhood referring to the other conflict party. In Study 2
, only few open-ended responses mentioned the other conflict party. Thus, it is important to measure both general and conflict-specific forms of victimhood (Vollhardt, 2015; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2014) . Conflict-specific forms of inclusive victimhood are presumably much rarer and psychologically more challenging than general notions of (selective) inclusive victimhood.
Methodologically, although it does not make full use of the information contained in continuous variables, the cluster analysis used in Study 1 allows studying different combinations of relationships-rather than merely linear relationships. This can shed light on the underlying motives for expressing different beliefs in different subgroups (see also Cohrs et al., 2003) . But since it is an exploratory technique, it was important to cross-validate the results using a different approach in Study 2.
Our research has several limitations. First, because both studies were correlational, causal directions could not be tested. Therefore, we cannot rule out that reconciliation influenced victim beliefs, or that third variables confounded the relationships. Also, we assessed dimensions of collective victimhood with available and partially overlapping measures. The factor analysis of these conceptually related measures is a contribution of our study. However, the relationships between these constructs need to be further examined, in particular how conflict-related victim beliefs relate to victim beliefs concerning other conflicts worldwide. Furthermore, despite the strengths of open-ended measures of selective and universal inclusive victimhood, quantitative measures asking about specific groups (e.g., with the same or different conflict positions) would provide more statistical power to test these effects. Complementarily, more in-depth qualitative research would add to our understanding of the complexities of people's subjective sense of victimhood in particular conflict contexts. A final limitation concerns our relatively small and well-educated convenience samples (although the sample in Study 2 was more diverse).
Knowledge about world history likely influences victim beliefs. Therefore, replicating these studies with larger and more diverse community samples, and in other post-conflict contexts, is crucial.
Our findings suggest important questions for further research on the distinction between universal and selective inclusivity, and on the processes underlying constructive versus destructive consequences of victim beliefs. We suggest that this difference may depend on individuals' subjective understandings of the conflict and the groups' conflict positions. Research in other contexts shows that people hold different representations of conflict (e.g., Stahel & Cohrs, 2015) that include beliefs about conflict causes, dynamics, barriers and approaches to conflict resolution and emotions towards the conflict parties. Such holistic conflict representations may influence which groups are included in individuals' sense of collective victimhood. Further research could investigate these propositions, and examine the underlying processes. For example, including other groups selectively into one's sense of victimhood may reduce willingness for reconciliation because knowing that the ingroup's specific victimization experiences are more widespread could increase perceived injustice and anger. Likewise, unity with other victim groups could increase perceived efficacy to tackle the other conflict party.
The relation between community membership and type of inclusivity, with universal inclusive victimhood being expressed more often by (high-status) Protestants (and Unionists) and selective inclusive victimhood by Catholics and Nationalists, suggests that these differences may be related to the groups' power differences: High-power groups may interpret a conflict more universally and desire symmetrical conflict resolution strategies (e.g., harmony-oriented intergroup encounters), whereas low-power groups may perceive asymmetries in the conflict and desire asymmetrical conflict resolution strategies (e.g., confrontation) (see Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010) .
Social identity content may also play a role in appraising the conflict (Livingstone & Haslam, 2008) . The overrepresentation of Nationalists (rather than Catholics) in the high inclusive-victimhood, high competitive-victimhood cluster in Study 1 may represent a more politicized section of the Catholic community that feels more strongly about the conflict. In general, the link between Catholic identity and Nationalist ideology has been weaker than the link identified Nationalists and Unionists did not allow for this to be tested in Study 2. Further understanding of how participants understand these identities will allow examining the precise relationship between identity and different victim beliefs.
A better understanding of these processes has promising implications for conflict resolution. Given how psychologically challenging it is to create a sense of common victimhood that includes the other conflict party (Noor et al., 2012) , research along the lines sketched above may inspire indirect conflict resolution strategies: Perceived similarities with other, unrelated victim groups may eventually "spill over" to attitudes towards the other conflict party (see Salomon, 2006) . There is great potential in research examining strategies through which negative consequences of inclusive victimhood can be avoided and its positive consequences harnessed. Noor, M., Shnabel, N., Halabi, S., & Nadler, A. (2012) . When suffering begets suffering: The psychology of competitive victimhood between adversarial groups in violent conflicts. Psychology Review, 16, 351-374. doi:10.1177/1088868312440048 Note. The Missing/Unclear cases consisted of 30 cases without an answer, 3 cases where any similarity to other groups' suffering was explicitly denied, and 7 cases that could not be interpreted as universal or selective. Note. Response scales ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Personality and Social

